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I. INTRODUCTION
One's view of section 337' of the Tariff Act of 1930 depends upon
his perspective. From the perspective of the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC), it affords a valuable avenue of
relief to American industries and firms suffering from unfair prac-
tices in the importation of goods into the United States. From the
perspective of practitioners representing foreign trade interests, it is
an administrative horror and a major non-tariff trade barrier. This
Article expresses the latter perspective.
Students of government administration are familiar with the fact
that interests tend to accrete around an institution, however obso-
lete or unnecessary it may be, and that mere existence becomes a
reason for continued existence. One would think there is sufficient
evidence that a remedy is unnecessary if it has been provided by law
for 50 years and utilized hardly at all. No doubt, that was the view
of the draftsmen of the trade bill sent to the Congress by the Admin-
istration in 1973.2 That bill would have transferred to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) the ITC's jurisdiction under section 337
in non-patent cases, leaving the ITC jurisdiction only in patent
cases. In addition, it would have removed the President from the
operation of the Act, in order not to require a decision of the Chief
Executive in a private controversy, and, thus, would have permitted
judicial review. Outright repeal of section 337 was not proposed,
presumably because vested interests already surrounded the patent
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia; Partner, Hemmendinger, Whitaker &
Kennedy.
** Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia; Associate, Hemmendinger, Whitaker
& Kennedy.
*** J.D. & M.S.F.S. Candidate, June 1978, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975). Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as in effect prior
to the Trade Act of 1974 amendments may be found at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (amended
1975).
1 See Hearings on H.R. 6767, The Trade Reform Act of 1973, Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6767 Hearings].
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remedy, although there was a good case for leaving patent remedies
to the courts.
It had been common knowledge that section 337, as it had devel-
oped between its original enactment in 1922 and 1973, was unsatis-
factory. The law was severely criticized because, while it was used
chiefly in patent cases, those defenses, which existed in the courts,
were of no avail before the Tariff Commission3 (which today is
known as the ITC).1 Doubts increased when the Supreme Court
questioned whether the statutory appeal to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals was inconsistent with the existence of a consti-
tutional court because of the President's final authority over deci-
sions.5
The ITC opposed the transfer of non-patent jurisdiction to the
FTC, and the House left this part of the law unchanged. When the
trade bill reached the Senate, little attention was focused on
amendments to section 337 in view of other important provisions
with larger policy implications. The section was then rewritten by
the staff of the Senate Finance Committee in order to deal with the
perceived defects in the preexisting law, in an attempt to protect the
rights of all parties. As amended, the law allowed respondents all
defenses that they would have in a court of law,' required proceed-
ings to be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),' and provided that in addition to matters of fact and law the
ITC should consider the public interest,8 including the views of
other agencies.' The President no longer had to make the final deter-
mination, 0 although he could set the order aside." Judicial review
in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was available if the
President upheld the ITC's decision. Procedural changes included
the provision of time limits, 3 the power to suspend investigations
in the event of parallel proceedings (without clarification of the
For a history of problems arising under section 337, see H.R. 6767 Hearings note 2 supra,
at 1353 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
The Trade Act of 1974 changed the name of the Tariff Commission to the International
Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (Supp. V 1975).
Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. V 1975).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 1337(b)(2),(3).
Id. § 1337(c).
Id. § 1337(g).
I Id. § 1337(c).
'3 Id. § 1337(b)(1).
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circumstances under which such suspension was appropriate),"' and
referral to the Treasury Department if the matter appeared to come
within the purview of dumping or countervailing duty investiga-
tions.'" The ITC was granted the power to issue cease and desist
orders, so that exclusion of the product was no longer the sole rem-
edy afforded.'" The effect of these well-meant amendments, how-
ever, is comparable to hanging so many sophisticated gadgets on an
airplane that cannot fly.
As it stands, section 337 is a hybrid with no clear concepts or
procedures to vindicate private rights or protect the public interest.
Although complaints are initiated by private parties, the ITC's staff
is also a party, and the ITC is instructed to consider the public
interest independent of private rights. The existence of a violation
is determined, it would appear, under existing legal principles found
in other statutes. The relief ordered, however, can be set aside in
the first instance by the President and then by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, if upheld by the President. This vehicle would
seem to be of little use in vindicating any rights at all.
The principal consequence of the changes in section 337 is one
that its draftsmen doubtless did not foresee. By bringing in the APA
and requiring the ITC to make rules consistent with the APA, all
the paraphernalia of discovery and motion practice as they have
developed in the federal courts have been introduced. There seems
to be a natural law requiring a lawyer to take any action to assist
his cause, no matter how marginal or remote that action may be to
a favorable resolution. Therefore, there are few practical limits on
the amount of pretrial activity that can be employed. The trouble
is compounded by the ITC's practice of including the investigative
staff as a party. Practitioners estimate that to present a case ade-
quately on either private side in a section 337 case costs at least five
times more than presenting a case under other trade statutes, such
as section 201 or the Antidumping Act of 1921.' 7 In addition, the
requirements of the APA, the complexities of antitrust litigation,
and the inclusion of a third party make it virtually impossible to
hear a section 337 case adequately within the time limits provided.
In patent cases the evils of section 337 are mitigated by the pres-
ence of a definite, underlying, litigable issue. Because of the time
14 Id.
,I Id. § 1337(b)(3).
I Id. § 1337(f).
17 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. V 1975); 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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limits imposed by the statute, the patent holder has some advan-
tages that he does not have in a federal court. He can apply pressure
faster. The main consequence, however, is a strong pressure on both
sides to settle the issue. The party with the larger purse has no more
advantage than he does in other patent cases. In non-patent section
337 cases, however, there is hopeless confusion between the vindica-
tion of private rights and the protection of the public interest. Such
confusion is not unknown in the fields of antitrust and unfair com-
petition, but, at least, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the FTC are acting in the public interest, and conse-
quences for private claims are secondary. The interrelationship of
these interests under section 337, however, is unclear. In the follow-
ing Article, these matters are examined systematically and possible
remedies are considered.
II. THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
UNDER SECTION 337
The ITC has recently breathed new life into section 337. Prior to
the enactment of the Trade Act of 19741s investigations under the
statute were largely limited to patent and "passing off" cases. 9 The
broad language providing for ITC investigations into "unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States"2' had only twice been used to undertake investi-
gations involving antitrust." Since the passage of the Trade Act of
1974, however, the ITC has undertaken investigations into alleged
antitrust violations in Above Ground Swimming Pools,2 Chicory
11 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in large part at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487)
(Supp. V 1975).
" SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM Acr OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 34, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7186, 7211 [hereinafter cited as
FINANCE COMM. REP.]: "[337] has been most often applied to articles entering the United
States in violation of claims under U.S. patents." See also Fischer, Protection Against Unfair
Foreign Competition: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 158, 165 (1972).
2 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
1 The two cases involving antitrust allegations were Tractor Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub.
No. 401 (June 1971) [hereinafter cited as Tractor Parts] and Watches, Watch Movements
and Watch Parts, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 177 (June 1966). For a history of non-patent
jurisdiction see Kaye & Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping
Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE
L. J. 1, 9-26 (1977).
11 Certain Above Ground Swimming Pools, Investigation No. 337-TA-25 (I.T.C., filed Feb.
25, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Swimming Pools]-allegations of predatory pricing practices
as well as patent violations.
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Root,13 Angolan Coffee,24 Color TV Sets, 5 and Stainless Steel Pipe.26
The initiation of these investigations has led to a vigorous debate
over the limits of ITC jurisdiction over unfair methods of competi-
tion in the import trade.
The ITC has provided only vague definitions of the scope of its
jurisdiction over unfair methods of competition. It has said that
"judicial determinations under other antitrust and unfair competi-
tion statutes ' 7 and "precedents arising under section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act"2 are important in determining what
constitutes a violation of section 337. In fact, the original provision
was intended by its drafters to reach "all forms of unfair competi-
tion"29 and, by implication, to be brandished as a weapon against
"unfair price cutting, full line forcing, commercial bribery, or any
other type of unfair competition."' 0 Arguably the entire range of
unfair trade practices comprehended by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion,3' Sherman, 32 Robinson-Patman,33 and Clayton 4 Acts are in-
21 Chicory Root-Crude and Prepared, Investigation No. 337-TA-27 (I.T.C., filed June 11,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Chicory Root]-predatory pricing included in the allegations.
24 In re Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, Investigation No. 337-TA-16 (I.T.C., filed Nov.
26, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Angolan Coffee].
" Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-TA-23 (I.T.C., filed Jan.
15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Color TV Sets]. Allegations include ". . . predatory pricing
schemes resulting in below cost and unreasonably low cost pricing. . . and economic benefits
and incentives from the Government of Japan .. " 41 Fed. Reg. 14,014 (1976).
" Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (I.T.C.,
filed Nov. 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Stainless Steel Pipe]. Allegations include sales at
unreasonably low prices, often below cost.
" In the opinion handed down in Tractor Parts, supra note 21, an investigation into charges
alleging conspiracy to boycott certain U.S. importers in the sale of tractor parts to the U.S.,
Commissioner Leonard stated:
Although there are no judicial precedents involving non-patent cases arising under
section 337, judicial determination under other antitrust and unfair competition
statutes are persuasive in determining what constitutes an unfair method or act
under section 337. Id. at 8.
Identical language was used in the Commission Memorandum Opinion at 9 in Chicory Root,
supra note 23.
21 Opinion of Commissioners Moore, Bedell and Parker In re Certain Electronic Audio and
Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (I.T.C., filed July 10, 1973), I.T.C. Pub. No.
768 (April 1976), [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50, 270 [hereinafter cited as Electronic
Audio Equipment].
" Statement by Senator Smoot prior to passage of section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 62
CONG. REc. 5879 (1922). The report on the bill stated that it was "broad enough to prevent
every type and form of unfair practice" in the importation of goods into the United States.
S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922). Section 316 contained the identical language
and was the predecessor of section 337. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 353, § 316, 42 Stat. 943.
"0 1922 TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP. 4.
31 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).-
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
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cluded when they occur "in the importation of articles . . .or in
their sale by the owner, importer, consignee or agent of either."35
While the broad language of section 337 has been in effect for
more than fifty years, the initiation by the ITC of investigations into
unfair methods of competition not involving the issue of patent
infringement creates a new perspective on this provision. One must
now consider the interrelationship of ITC investigations with those
of other agencies and with the body of antitrust and unfair trade
practice jurisprudence of those agencies. For instance, in Color TV
Sets the Department of Justice seriously questioned whether the
facts alleged indicated that an antitrust investigation was appropri-
ate and strongly indicated that the Department would not act in
such a situation. Assistant Attorney General Baker found a
''puzzling inconsistency" between the complainant's charge that
domestic firms had been injured by imports being sold in the United
States at unreasonably low prices on the one hand, and the charge
that a conspiracy was evidenced by an export agreement setting
minimum prices on goods exported to the United States on the
other.3 Baker further stated that the export association upon which
the conspiracy charge was based would be fully exempt from the
operation of the Sherman Act under the provisions of the Webb-
Pomerene Act37 if entered into by United States firms, and that the
Justice Department policy was to extend similar exemptions to for-
eign export associations.8 Similarly, the initiation by the ITC of
investigations which could be adjudicated by other agencies raises
the specter of concurrent and competing investigations involving
identical or similar facts in several agencies of the United States
Government.
The evolution of ITC authority under section 337 has given rise
to numerous questions which remain unresolved. First, assuming
that its subject matter jurisdiction is broad and sweeping, what
legal or policy limitations exist to prevent the ITC from emerging
as a competing antitrust enforcement agency? Second, is the ITC,
which has traditionally been a fact finding agency, competent to
perform quasi-judicial functions, and can such functions in the anti-
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21(a) (1970).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1970).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
11 Letter from Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy (Feb. 6, 1977) at 3 [hereinafter cited as Baker Letter].
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
-1 Baker Letter, supra note 36, at 5.
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trust area be adequately performed within the constraints of the
statute? Third, are the remedies and enforcement merchanisms pro-
vided the ITC appropriate and preferable to those which other agen-
cies have? Fourth, what effect will broader ITC action in the anti-
trust area have on our international economic relations?
III. THE CONFLICT OVER JURISDICTION
The assumption by the ITC of jurisdiction in cases which would
have been adjudicated by or before other agencies prior to the enact-
ment of the Trade Act of 1974 and the new activist posture of the
ITC have made the subject matter jurisdiction the principal issue
in the debate over section 337.1 To date, the issue of whether and
to what extent the ITC can and should assume jurisdiction concur-
rently with other agencies has focused on its investigations of mat-
ters within the authority of the Department of Treasury under the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The ITC's liberal and
expansive interpretation of its authority in these cases where the
arguments for restraint are most compelling, however, might indi-
cate that one can expect similar encroachment on the jurisdiction
of the FTC and the Department of Justice."0
The initiation by the ITC of the controversial investigation into
the importation of television sets from Japan in March 1976 precipi-
tated the debate over the ITC jurisdiction." The complaint charged
practices involving substantially the same facts and questions of law
as those previously litigated before the Department of Treasury
under both the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, the
latter of which was then pending before the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.2 Although the complainants subsequently added a
transparent conspiracy charge,4 3 presumably to bring the matter
within the ITC's jurisdiction over antitrust violations involving
"' See Leonard and Foster, The Metamorphosis of the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 751 (1976).
" Commissioner Minchew has, in essence, stated that he believes ITC jurisdiction with
respect to unfair acts is coterminous with that of virtually all other antitrust statutes and
that the provision of the cease and desist-power in the Trade Act of 1974 is substantiation of
this fact. The only apparent limit he recognizes is that imposed by the necessary involvement
of imports. See Recommended Determination of Presiding Officer Minchew, in Electronic
Audio Equipment, note 28 supra, at 55,549. In light of the broad interpretation by the ITC
the possibility of conflicting jurisdiction with the FTC or Justice is not remote. See text infra
at notes 74-83.
" Color TV Sets, supra note 25. See Lawrence, TV Impact Probe Spurs Agency Row, J.
Com., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
"' See note 62 infra. See also Recent Development, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (1978).
13 Color TV Sets, supra note 25. See text infra at notes 90-91.
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imports into the United States, the investigation represented a sig-
nificant and unprecedented exercise of the ITC's subject matter
jurisdiction under section 337. A second investigation into allega-
tions which could arguably fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Department of Treasury, that of Stainless Steel Pipe," was initi-
ated in February 1977, raising similar jurisdictional issues.
Pursuant to section 337(b)(2),45 the ITC in Color TVSets received
the advice and information of the Department of State," the Special
Trade Representative,47 the Federal Trade Commission,48 and the
Justice49 and Treasury0 Departments. All agreed that the ITC either
did not, as a matter of law, possess statutory jurisdiction over mat-
ters actionable under the countervailing duty or antidumping laws,
or that it should, as a matter of policy, refrain from exercising juris-
diction.' Although Congress, under section 337(b)(1)," provided a
11 See text infra at note 92.
15 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). The provision reads:
(2) During the course of each investigation under this section, the Commission
shall consult with, and seek advice and information from, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade
Commission, and such other departments and agencies as it considers appropriate.
Letter from Charles W. Robinson, Acting Secretary of State, to Will E. Leonard, Chair-
man of the ITC (Sept. 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Robinson Letter].
11 Letter from Frederick B. Dent, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, to Will
E. Leonard, Chairman of the ITC (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as the Dent Letter].
11 Letter from Charles A. Tobin, Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission, to Kenneth
R. Mason, Secretary of the ITC (Aug. 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Tobin Letter].
11 Letter from Jonathon C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Will E. Leonard,
Chairman of the ITC (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Rose Letter]; see also Baker
Letter, note 36 supra.
10 Letter from William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, to Will E. Leonard, Chairman
of the ITC (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Simon Letter]; Letter from David R.
MacDonald, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, to Will E. Leonard, Chair-
man of the ITC (Apr. 14, 1975) [hereinafter cited as MacDonald Letter]; Letter from Peter
0. Suchman, Deputy of the Treasury for Tariff Affairs, to Will E. Leonard, Chairman of the
ITC (June 18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Suchman Letter].
5' The advice of the Treasury Department is representative: "[linsofar as any Commission
investigation is based solely on dumping or bounty or grant allegations, no remedy exists
under section 337 and such investigation should be terminated." Simon Letter, supra note
50.
The State Department and others agreed with the ITC that it may take jurisdiction if
allegations not solely within the antidumping and countervailing duty laws are charged: it
contended, however, that "based on both policy and legal grounds," the ITC must refer to
the Treasury for a determination of the issues falling within the antidumping and countervail-
ing duty statutes. Robinson Letter, supra note 46, at 2. See text infra at notes 105-08.
52 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The provision reads in part:
For purposes of the one-year and 18-month periods prescribed by this subsection,
there shall be excluded any period of time during which such investigation is sus-
pended because of proceedings in a court or agency of the United States involving
similar questions concerning the subject matter of such investigation.
REPEAL § 337
mechanism whereby the ITC might suspend an ongoing investiga-
tion in the event of "concurrent proceedings involving similar issues
concerning the same subject matter before a court or agency of the
U.S.,"53 the ITC declined to exercise this power in Color TV Sets."
The traditional role of the ITC in antidumping and countervailing
duty matters, as defined in section 201 of the Antidumping Act of
1921-5 and section 303 of the Tariff Act of 193056 has been limited to
determining whether articles imported into the United States have
injured or are likely to injure or prevent the establishment of a
United States industry. 7 The ITC's role in antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty matters under those statutes is dependent upon a
prior affirmative finding by the Treasury that foreign goods have
been sold at less than fair value in the United States market or are
receiving subsidies and incentives from foreign governments upon
export to the United States. 8 By assuming jurisdiction in cases
alleging practices that would, if proven, constitute violations of the
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes, the ITC duplicates
the role of the Treasury Department which has historically made
the determination of whether an unfair import practice has been
committed. While the Trade Act of 1974 marginally expands the
'3 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 194.
" Color TV Sets, Memorandum Opinion (Dec. 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Memoran-
dum Opinion].
19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975).
' 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) provides:
(a) Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter called the "Secretary")
determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be,
sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall so advise
the United States International Trade Commission (hereinafter called the
"Commission"), and the Commission shall determine within three months there-
after whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or
is prevented from being established, by reason of the importation of such merchan-
dise into the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(b)(1) Whenever the Secretary makes a final determination under subsection (a)
of this section that a bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed with respect to any
article or merchandise which is free of duty and a determination by the Commission
is required under subsection (a)(2) of this section, he shall-
(A) so advise the Commission, and the Commission shall determine within three
months thereafter, and after such investigation as it deems necessary, whether an
industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from
being established, by reason of the importation of such article or merchandise into
the United States; and the Commission shall notify the Secretary of its determina-
tion. . ..
Id. Although it seldom occurs, the Treasury may refer the injury question to the ITC prior
to its own investigation, 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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role of the ITC under the antidumping statute,59 the amendments
to that statute do not contemplate parallel determinations by the
Treasury Department and the ITC as to whether unfair pricing
practices exist.
Should the ITC continue to assert jurisdiction over matters falling
within the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, it is feared
that section 337 will be employed by United States firms, which lose
dumping or countervailing duty cases, to take "a 'second shot' at
keeping out foreign competition or heaping legal costs on foreign
sellers." 0 Such actions would be clearly inconsistent with the intent
of Congress as stated in the Senate Finance Committee Report to
"eliminate unnecessary and costly investigations which are an ad-
ministrative burden and an impediment to trade."'" The attraction
of a second chance to United States businesses and manufacturers
attempting to protect domestic sales markets from vigorous foreign
competition is understandable, particularly since a substantial por-
tion of the costs of section 337 investigations are borne, not by the
firm, but by American taxpayers. 2 Finally, unilateral action on the
part of the ITC over alleged dumping practices and foreign export
" See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975) which allows the ITC to make preliminary
inquiries into an injury suffered by a United States industry if the Secretary of the Treasury
concludes that there is substantial doubt that an industry is or is likely to be injured.
11 Baker Letter, supra note 36, at 3. The possibility that section 337 might be used as a
means of harassing foreign competitors was considered by the departments and agencies
advising the ITC to be a significant danger. The letter of the Justice Department to Chairman
Leonard is illustrative:
A second concern is the possibility that domestic firms faced with vigorous foreign
competition could, if the Commission permitted it, file simultaneous dumping,
countervailing duty, private actions, and 337 cases on the bases of unsupported
allegations of pricing, bounties or grants, or conspiracies and thus subject importers
to substantial expense and harassment which may unfairly damage their competi-
tive position. Rose Letter, supra note 49, at 11.
Special Trade Representative, Frederick B. Dent, characterized the duplication of Treasury
proceedings by the ITC under section 337 in the Color TV Sets case as being "an unjustifiable
and serious burden" on respondents to the action. Dent Letter, supra note 47, at 2.
" FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 171.
A propensity to institute a multiplicity of actions involving similar factual circumstances
and legal questions was evident in Color TV Sets, where a respondents' motion to terminate
the proceedings was denied despite prior Treasury Department determinations on the issues
of dumping and subsidization, an appeal of the Treasury's negative finding of Japanese
export subsidies, and a pending action in federal district court alleging similar claims of
conspiratorial activity and predatory pricing. See, Motion of Respondents to Terminate the
Proceedings and Dismiss the Complaint, (I.T.C., filed June 14, 1976), and Ruling Denying
Such Motion, (July 19, 1976); Simon Letter, supra note 50, at 1. Proceedings were finally
suspended after a section 201 escape clause action had been brought before the ITC. Notice
of Suspension of Investigation, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 54. A settlement by the
parties to the section 337 proceeding was finally reached, see note 63 infra.
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subsidization may impair United States export markets by provok-
ing international retaliation, compromise the U.S. position at the
multilateral trade negotiations, 3 and jeopardize the successful com-
pletion of ongoing negotiations between the United States and its
foreign competitors to establish an international code covering the
payment of subsidies and the application of countervailing duty
laws.64
In November 1976, the issue of concurrent jurisdiction was raised
when respondents filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia to enjoin the ITC from proceeding further
in its investigation in Color TV Sets. 5 The Court apparently
granted the motion of the ITC to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals provides the
appropriate forum for review after a final determination has been
rendered by the ITC.6 In World-Wide Volkswagen v. USITC,7 an
earlier decision by the same court, Judge Gesell, citing Coca-Cola
Co. v. FTC"5 and Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC,"5 suggested that had the ITC
exercised authority "in excess of its jurisdiction" or "plainly beyond
its jurisdiction as a matter of law," a court injunction might have
" The ITC was advised by the State Department in Color TV Sets that concurrent adjudi-
cations of dumping and countervailing duty issues in the Treasury and the ITC would:
"damage our relations with Japan, directly contradict our stated foreign policy objectives of
gaining the removal of artificial barriers to trade, and compromise our position at the multi-
lateral trade negotiations in Geneva." Robinson Letter, supra note 46, at 2.
64 See text infra at notes 95-98; the advice of the Special Trade Representative's Office to
the ITC included these thoughts:
The uncertainty of duplicative proceedings not only threatens specific trade, but
could cast serious doubt upon the ability of United States negotiators to fashion
international regulations governing practices such as subsidies and the application
of countervailing duties. A subsidies code is one of the key international objectives
of the United States in the multilateral trade negotiations. The regulation of subsi-
dies is a key objective of the Congress contained in the Trade Act of 1974. This
objective was determined serious enough to allow the waiver of countervailing du-
ties in connection with the trade negotiations. The appearance of providing entirely
separate remedies, administered without reference to the existing countervailing
duty law, could pose a serious threat to obtaining the United States trade policy
objectives established by the Congress and the President. Dent Letter, supra note
47, at 3-4.
65 Melco Sales v. USITC, No. 76-1932 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 15, 1976).
Id. Judge Waddy orally ruled on November 19, 1976, that: the district court did not have
jurisdiction, but failed to specify reasons; that the proper forum was the Customs Court; that,
even if the district court had jurisdiction, the issue was not ripe for review; and that the
adequacy of the plaintiffs standing was not clear.
1 414 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1976).
* 475 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1973).
6 472 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1972).
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been appropriate. 0 Presumably, then, the issue of ITC jurisdiction
over matters falling within the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws is an open question that will ultimately be resolved by
appeal of an ITC final determination to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals or the Supreme Court.
The ITC bases its authority over practices constituting violations
of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws in part upon the
broad power granted by Congress to investigate "[u]nfair methods
of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either. . .. " The courts have interpreted the jurisdic-
tional language of section 337 to be both "broad" and "inclusive"
in scope.72 The addition of cease and desist powers under the Trade
Act of 1974, which expanded the range of violations for which the
ITC could provide effective relief under section 337, might be con-
sidered a signal for the ITC to utilize more fully its sweeping man-
date against unfair import practices. 3
The ITC has not interpreted section 337 jurisdiction to be limited
by parallel actions in courts or other agencies.7 The concluding
7o World-Wide Volkswagen, 414 F. Supp. 713, 717 (D.D.C. 1976).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975). See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 54.
In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 444 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
" Prior to enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the Commission's remedies were limited to
exclusion of articles from entry into the United States. Statutory authority to issue cease and
desist orders is found at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. V 1975). Chairman Minchew stated in a
recent law review article that the Trade Act of 1974 amendments expand the authority of the
Commission under section 337:
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the Tariff Commission was con-
cerned primarily with violation of U.S. patent rights in unfair trade practice ac-
tions. Now, the Commission has the authority to go well beyond patents. This
provision has greatly increased the authority of the Commission. It would appear,
to this Commissioner at least, that the unfair trade practice section now enables
the Commission to extend its investigations into false pricing, false advertising,
mislabeling, and false representation of source, in all instances where an interna-
tional product is involved. Minchew, The Expanding Role of the United States
International Trade Commission, 27 MERCER L. REv. 429, 437 (1976) (emphasis
added).
Although Chairman Minchew does not indicate which new provisions of section 337 lead him
to draw this conclusion, it cannot come from the jurisdictional section of the statute. As noted
by former Chairman Will E. Leonard, "[tlhe wording of section 337 with respect to subject
matter jurisdiction," unfair methods of competition and unfair acts, "has not changed."
Leonard & Foster, supra note 39, at 751. The Senate Finance Committee makes clear that
"[n]o change has been made in the substance of the jurisdiction conferred under section
337(a) with respect to unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the import trade."
FiNANCE COMM. RE'., supra note 19, at 194. Presumably, then, the Commission's expanded
authority has to stem from the other provisions added to section 337 by the Trade Act.
1, Kaye & Plaia, Jr., Tariff Act Section 337 Revisited: A Review of Developments Since
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clause of the jurisdictional paragraph of section 337, providing that
unfair methods and acts shall be dealt with by the ITC "in addition
to any other provisions of law,"7 has been literally construed.7 The
ITC has not considered decisions by federal courts on issues of pat-
ent violations to be controlling or binding upon an investigation into
similar matters under section 337.77 Similarly, the ITC has contin-
ued investigations into alleged antitrust violations, despite concur-
rent litigation involving similar facts and questions of law in federal
courts or agencies. 78
Although no case has decided the issue of whether jurisdiction
under section 337 is limited by the existence of concurrent litigation
involving similar facts or issues of law brought in federal courts or
other agencies under other antitrust or unfair trade practice stat-
utes, the Supreme Court had occasion in the 1948 case of FTC v.
Cement Institute" to decide a parallel question of whether an action
charging unfair methods of competition under section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act should be dismissed because concurrent
proceedings based largely on the same misconduct had been
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act.80 Justice Black, writing
for the Court, stated:
the Amendment of 1975, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3, 37 (1977). This article states that:
The International Trade Commission has a history since Furazolidone [19691 of
not suspending an investigation when there is concurrent litigation. The question
of the Commission's use of its discretion in the area seems to be developing in line
with its position prior to the passage of the new amendments. In many recent cases
(Chicory . . . Monolythic Catalytic Converters. . . and Solder Removal Wicks),
concurrent litigation has been pending in the federal courts involving similar facts
and questions of law and the Commission has not deferred to the courts.
7' 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
7' Memorandum Opinion, supra note 54, at 8. For a discussion of the "in addition to"
language of subsection 337(a), see Kaye & Plaia, Jr., Section 337 Revisited, Causes in the
Importation of Goods: An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337, 57 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'Y
202, 234 (1975).
" The statements of Commissioners Leonard and Minchew in the investigation of Elec-
tronic Pianos, I.T.C. Pub. No. 721, (Mar. 1975) at 27, is indicative.
The decision of the court in the case at hand should therefore be viewed, not in
terms of having some kind of imagined binding effect on the Commission nor in
terms of an opinion which must in some way be given credence in the Commission's
finding, but rather in terms of what it actually is-an opinion relating to a given
set of facts with which the Commission, given sufficient justification, may agree or
disagree, whether in whole or in part.
For a good discussion of the applicability of section 337 to antitrust violations, see Fisher,
note 19 supra; Silbiger, Trade Act of 1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in
International Trade, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 77 (1975).
" FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Cement Institute].
0 Id.
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[Tihe fact that the same conduct may constitute a violation of
both acts in nowise requires us to dismiss this Commission pro-
ceeding. Just as the Sherman Act itself permits the attorney gen-
eral to bring simultaneous civil and criminal suits against a defen-
dant based on the same misconduct, so the Sherman Act and the
Trade Commission Act provide the Government with cumulative
remedies against activities detrimental to competition.,
The "in addition to" language of section 337 arguably empowers
the ITC to act despite the existence of remedies against similar
misconduct provided by other statutes administered by the courts
or other federal agencies. Based upon the Supreme Court opinion
in Cement Institute, a proceeding initiated by one agency of the
Government does not of itself bar concurrent litigation based upon
similar facts or questions of law before another agency. 2 It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the Court's decision in Cement Institute
is applicable to ITC jurisdiction. Significantly, the Court reasoned
that: "Both the legislative history of the Trade Commission Act and
its specific language indicate a congressional purpose not to confine
each of these proceedings within narrow, mutually exclusive limits,
but rather to permit simultaneous use of both types of proceed-
ings."8 3 Although no provision of section 337 prohibits the ITC from
exercising jurisdiction over violations falling within the ambit of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the legislative history of
the Act, other provisions of the statute, and the provisions of the
countervailing duty law, place implicit limitations on simultaneous
proceedings.
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the ITC had,
apparently, "entertained" matters which might fall within the an-
tidumping law on only four occasions and had never initiated an
investigation into conduct that would violate the antidumping or
countervailing duty statutes. 4 The report of the Senate Finance
Committee on the Trade Act of 1974 stated that the ITC was
''expected" to continue its practice of not investigating matters
s1 Id. at 694.
2Id.
Id. at 694-95.
The ITC investigative staff was able to unearth only four instances in the entire history
of the Tariff Act in which the ITC has "entertained" dumping matters: Briarwood Pipes,
(Tariff Comm'n 1926); Russian Asbestos, Investigation No. 1, (Tariff Comm'n 1933); Ceramic
Floor & Wall Tile, Investigation No. 337-L-33 (Tariff Comm'n, filed Mar. 29, 1966); Present
Variable Resistance Controls, Investigation No. 337-L-63 (Tariff Comm'n 1966). Response of
Commission Investigative Staff to Amended Motion on Certain Respondents to Terminate
Proceedings and Dismiss Complaint, Color TV Sets, supra note 25, at 7-8.
[Vol. 8:81
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clearly within the purview of either section 303 [the countervailing
duty statute] or the Antidumping Act." 5 Moreover, Congress
added a new subsection 337(b)(3) in the Trade Act of 1974 amend-
ments which provides:
Whenever in the course of an investigation under this section, the
Commission has reason to believe, based on information before it,
that the matter may come within the purview of section 303 or of
the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall promptly notify the Secretary
of the Treasury so that such action may be taken as is otherwise
authorized by such section and such Act."
The directive of the Senate Finance Committee to refrain from
investigating matters clearly within the purview of section 303 or the
antidumping law together with the statutory duty to "promptly
notify" the Secretary of the Treasury of such matters coming to the
attention of the Commission, undoubtedly was intended to limit the
ITC's jurisdiction. The ITC contends that subsection 337(b)(3) con-
stitutes a mere procedural obligation rather than a substantive limi-
tation on its subject matter jurisdiction, 7 and that in actions charg-
ing "broader allegations" than those "clearly" falling within the
antidumping or countervailing duty laws, the ITC may assert juris-
diction.88
It is apparent, however, that what the ITC refers to as "broader
allegations" is not significantly different from "matters clearly
within the purview" of the antidumping or countervailing duty stat-
ute. If the ITC is free to continue to assert jurisdiction over anti-
dumping and countervailing duty matters in the context of "broad-
er allegations" as defined by the ITC, no genuine limitation on ITC
jurisdiction in this area in fact exists. "Broader allegations" were
found to exist in Color TV Sets by the inclusion of conspiracy and
monopolization charges in the amended complaint.Y The antitrust
11 FINANCE Comm. REP., supra note 19, at 195. The Commission has convoluted the meaning
of this statement by redefining what is meant by the Commission's "practice" and then
claiming to continue in that practice. "The 'Commission's practice' referred to by the Senate
Finance Committee is that correspondence and other inquiries alleging the suspected exist-
ences of dumping or export subsidization have been routinely routed to Treasury, as they are
today." Memorandum Opinion, supra note 54, at 11. The practice referred to in the FINANCE
COMM. REP. of "not investigating matters clearly within the purview of section 303 or the
Antidumping Act" is, of course, not the same.
* 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
* Memorandum Opinion, supra note 54, at 10.
Id. at 11.
I d. The original complaint charged: "The existence of predatory pricing schemes result-
ing in below cost and unreasonably low pricing of such television sets in the United States,
and economic benefits and incentives from the Government of Japan contributing to the
19781
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issues raised by the amended complaint were considered by Jona-
thon C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to "go no further
than alleging joint activity to do those things complained of in the
original complaint." 90 In his letter of advice to the ITC, Rose pres-
enting the view of the Justice Department, continued:
Nothing is alleged which is intrinsically different than the original
charge of predatory pricing. In these circumstances, the Commis-
sion does not face an entirely new, antitrust-related issue, but the
same antidumping complaint with a surface gloss of antitrust,
hastily added and submitted without any supporting evidence
similar to the price and cost computations made in the original
complaint."
Again, in Stainless Steel Pipe, Rose asserted:
[C]omplainants apparently have no basis on which to assert that
the Japanese exporters have acted conspiratorily. Thus, this case
is even weaker than the Japanese TV set matter . . . In this case,
there is absolutely no basis for finding that the allegations are
broader than or different from those within the purview of the
Antidumping Act.2
In fact, the ITC continued the investigation based only upon the
issue of unreasonably low prices (even after the administrative
judge had stricken the conspiracy issue from the investigation), and
on February 22, 1978, issued a cease and decease order against 11
Japanese firms in this case.' 3
Balancing the directive in the Senate Finance Committee Report
and the statutory notice provisions of section 337(b)(3) with the
stated policy of Congress to "eliminate unnecessary and costly in-
vestigations," it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended
to place some limitations upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the
ITC, at least over antidumping and countervailing duty matters. To
suggest that the notice provisions of section 337 were designed to
permit the Treasury Department to initiate proceedings duplicative
below cost and unreasonably low cost pricing in the United States." 41 Fed. Reg. 14014.
Letters of advice and information to the ITC indicate that these allegations fall squarely
within the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes. Rose Letter, supra note 49, at 5,
8; Tobin Letter, supra note 48, at 3; McDonald Letter, supra note 50, at 1; Suchman Letter,
supra note 50, at 2.
" Rose Letter, supra note 49, at 8.
91 Id.
12 Letter of Jonathon C. Rose, infra note 141, at 2-3.
11 See Prehearing Order No. 16, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26, (denying respondents
motion to terminate the investigation after the presiding officer had eliminated the conspir-
acy issue) and I.T.C. Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978).
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of key elements in an ITC investigation would appear to be incon-
sistent with this congressional policy. 4 Moreover, because the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty statutes embody a considered
and well-developed body of law within the experience and expertise
of the Treasury Department 5 and provide relief specifically tailored
to remedy practices violative of those statutes," it does not require
a strained interpretation of congressional intent to conclude that the
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes administered by the
Treasury were intended to provide the primary, if not exclusive,
remedy against foreign dumping practices and export subsidization.
On this point, Frederick Dent, the President's Special Trade Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations stated, "[tihe Congress in passing
the Trade Act of 1974 recognized that the Antidumping Act and the
countervailing duty law had worked over a number of years into
sophisticated instruments aimed at preventing the use of specific
unfair acts in connection with imports into the United States."97
Having devoted considerable effort in the Trade Act of 1974 to pro-
vide statutory changes to improve the administration of these provi-
sions, it would seem unlikely that Congress would vest the ITC with
unlimited and undefined subject matter jurisdiction over anti-
dumping and countervailing duty matters."
The role assumed by the ITC in countervailing duty matters
under section 337 is also plainly inconsistent with the specific provi-
sions of the countervailing duty provisions of the Trade Act of
1974.9 Assuming that wherever possible statutes are to be read con-
sistently with one another, the provisions of the countervailing duty
law implicitly limit the scope of ITC jurisdiction over foreign export
subsidization. Subsection 303(d)(2) authorizes the Secretary of
Treasury to suspend countervailing duties for the purpose of expe-
" Baker Letter, supra note 36, at 3; Dent Letter, supra note 47, at 3.
" Simon Letter, supra note 50, at 2 states:
The Treasury Department has been responsible for the administration of the Antid-
umping Act for 55 years, and the countervailing duty law for almost 80 years.
During this time the Department has acquired considerable experience and exper-
tise, and has established many precedents. It is apparent to the Department that
the Congress has recognized the experience and expertise of the Treasury in the
antidumping and countervailing duty area and sought to make clear a distinction
between trading practices which might be viewed as unfair within the meaning of
section 337 and practices which are cognizable under the Antidumping Act or
countervailing duty law.
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V 1975) and 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
" Dent Letter, supra note 47, at 2.
'7 Id., at 3.
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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diting ongoing negotiations to establish international rules and pro-
cedures governing export subsidization and the application of coun-
tervailing duty laws.'00 The Senate Finance Committee Report em-
phasized the importance of this discretionary power:
The Committee believes that, in the final analysis, the interests of
the United States will be best served by international agreement
permanently eliminating the use of governmental subsidies which
distort trade patterns. The forthcoming negotiations may offer the
occasion for such an agreement, and the Committee recognizes
that, in order to enable international resolution of the difficult
problems involved in connection with subsidies, the Secretary of
the Treasury must have flexibility to suspend the imposition of
countervailing duties where such imposition would jeopardize ne-
gotiations authorized under section 102 of this Act.' °
Unilateral action on the part of the ITC in countervailing duty
matters would impair the effectiveness of suspending countervailing
'IQ 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(1) It is the sense of the Congress that the President, to the extent practicable
and consistent with United States interests, seek through negotiations the estab-
lishment of internationally agreed rules and procedures governing the use of subsi-
dies (and other export incentives) and the application of countervailing duties.
(2) If, after seeking information and advice from such agencies as he may deem
appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury determines, at any time during the four-
year period beginning on January 3, 1975,that-
(A) adequate steps have been taken to reduce substantially or elimi-
nate during such period the adverse effect of a bounty or grant which he
has determined is being paid or bestowed with respect to any article or
merchandise;
(B) there is a reasonable prospect that, under section 2112 of this
title, successful trade agreements will be entered into with foreign coun-
tries or instrumentalities providing for the reduction or elimination of
barriers to or other distortions of international trade; and
(C) the imposition of the additional duty under this section with
respect to such article or merchandise would be likely to seriously jeop-
ardize the satisfactory completion of such negotiations;
the imposition of the additonal duty under this section with respect to such article
or merchandise shall not be required during the remainder of such four-year period.
This paragraph shall not apply with respect to any case involving non-rubber foot-
wear pending on January 3, 1975, until and unless agreements which temporize
imports of non-rubber footwear become effective.
(3) The determination of the Secretary under paragraph (2) may be revoked by
him, in his discretion, at any time, and any determination made under such para-
graph shall be revoked whenever the basis supporting such determinatior no longer
exists. The additional duty provided under this section shall apply with respect to
any affected articles or merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption on or after the date of publication of any revocation under this subsec-
tion in the Federal Register.
101 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 186.
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duties as a means of expediting international negotiations. As stated
by the Special Trade Representative, Frederick Dent, "[tihe ap-
pearance of providing entirely separate remedies, administered
without reference to the existing countervailing duty law, could pose
a threat to obtaining the United States trade policy objectives es-
tablished by the Congress and the President.' '02 Because the Secre-
tary of the Treasury exercises no statutory control over the applica-
tion of remedies under section 337, his discretion to suspend sanc-
tions against foreign export subsidization would be subject to the
whim of the ITC.'0 3 It follows that Congress could not have intended
to vest the Secretary of the Treasury with the autonomous and
carefully proscribed discretion provided in the countervailing duty
statute and at the same time confer unlimited jurisdiction upon the
ITC in the countervailing duty area.
To the extent that section 337 investigations, particularly the
Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel Pipe investigations, merely dupli-
cate antidumping or countevailing duty proceedings before the
Treasury Department, they are unnecessary and undesirable. Al-
though it is arguable from the language in subsection 337(b)(1) that
the ITC must initiate an investigation upon every properly filed
complaint,0 4 that subsection also provides a statutory mechanism
102 Dent Letter, supra note 47, at 4. The imposition of an exclusion order by the ITC, for
example, could be far more devastating to the trade negotiations than the existence of a
countervailing duty. The uncertainty of duplicative proceedings and the absence of a -clear
definition of standards to be applied or of the remedy to be employed impair the ability of
United States' negotiators to reach agreement as to the rules and procedures for controlling
export subsidies.
"I The discretion of Congress in overriding the decision of the Treasury Secretary to repeal
sanctions against foreign export subsidization would also be impaired. This override power
is provided in § 303(e)(2) of the countervailing duty law. No congressional override for ITC
determinations exists under section 337. Thus, if the ITC finds an unfair import practice is
committed as a result of export subsidies paid by foreign governments, neither the Treasury
Secretary nor Congress has any statutory control over the remedy and sanctions applied by
the Commission.
19 U.S.C. § 1303(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975), reads:
(2) If, at any time after the document referred to in paragraph (1) is delivered
to the House of Representatives and the Senate, either the House or the Senate
adopts, by an affirmative vote of a majority of those present and voting in that
House, a resolution of disapproval under the procedures set forth in section 2192,
then such determination under subsection (d)(2) with respect to such article or
merchandise shall have no force or effect beginning with the day after the date of
the adoption of such resolution of disapproval, and the additional duty provided
under this section with respect to such article or merchandise shall apply with
respect to articles or merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for con-
sumption on or after such day.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The ITC maintains that subsection 337(b)(1)
legally binds it to initiate a full investigation upon any properly filed complaint, Memoran-
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whereby ITC proceedings may be suspended if duplicative of pro-
ceedings in federal courts or agencies:
For purposes of the one-year and 18-month periods prescribed by
this subsection, there shall be excluded any period of time during
which such investigation is suspended because of proceedings in a
court or agency of the United States involving similar questions
concerning the subject matter of such investigation.'
The purpose of this provision is set forth in the Senate Finance
Committee Report:
The provision for the tolling of the running of the time limits
provided by this amended section is intended to apply to situations
where section 337 proceedings are suspended due to concurrent
proceedings involving similar issues concerning the same subject
matter before a court or agency of the U.S.'"
If read in conjunction with the Senate Finance Committee's ex-
pressed desire to "eliminate unnecessary and costly investiga-
tions,"'' 7 it provides a strong basis for the ITC to suspend duplica-
tive proceedings.
Taking into account the possibility that section 337 will be abused
as a vehicle for harassing foreign competitors, the international
ramifications of unilateral action by the ITC in the antidumping
dum Opinion, supra note 54, at 13-15. The contention is based upon the statutory language
of subsection 337(b)(1): "The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this
section on complaint under oath or upon its own initiative ..." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The obligatory language was added by the Trade Act of
1974 amendments. The ITC believes that the provision strips it of any discretion to terminate
an ongoing investigation or to refrain from initiating one, providing a complaint is properly
filed. The argument is not without merit given the unfortunate wording of the statute. Other
factors indicate that the ITC is wrong.
The Senate Finance Committee clarifies the intent of Congress: "Section 337(b)(1) of the
Act, as amended by the bill would continue, as under present law, to authorize the Commis-
sion to investigate alleged violations of section 337 on complaint or on the Commission
initiative." FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 194 (emphasis added). The plain meaning
of this passage is that the amended subsection 337(b)(1) "authorizes," but does not require,
the ITC to investigate. Further, the authority is "as under present law," which in no way
obliged the ITC to investigate upon every properly filed complaint (emphasis added).
Further evidence that the ITC is in error stems from a contradiction between its position
and subsection 332(g) of the Tariff Act as amended. This provision requires the ITC to submit
annual reports to Congress detailing, among other things, a list of all complaints filed under
section 337 and "[tihe action taken on each complaint." If the ITC were limited to only one
action, i.e., initiation of a full investigation, there would be no need to describe the action
taken.
" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
104 FiNANCE COMM. REp., supra note 19, at 194.
107 Id. at 171.
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and countervailing duty areas, and the questionable authority of the
1TC over practices falling within the antidumping and countervail-
ing duty statutes, it would be preferable for the ITC to employ its
suspension powers until determinations on the antidumping and
countervailing duty issues are rendered by the Treasury Depart-
ment. Even though the ITC might properly assert jurisdiction on
the basis of a complaint charging "broader allegations" than those
falling squarely within the purview of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty statutes, to the extent that the latter constitute ele-
ments of the alleged unfair practices, the ITC ought to defer to the
Treasury.0 8 Based upon the investigation and findings of the Treas-
ury Department, the ITC can then determine whether the "broader
allegations" merit relief under section 337.
Similarly, where investigations initiated by the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission are in process and involve
similar issues of fact and law, the ITC should consider suspension.
Continuation of simultaneous parallel actions in two forums oper-
ates as a hardship on the parties defending, risks the possibility of
contradictory resolutions, and unnecessarily expends public re-
sources. By granting the ITC authority to suspend investigations
under section 337 and expressing a preference for avoiding duplica-
tive proceedings, the Congress has at least indicated that the ITC
should be responsive to problems created by the concurrent exercise
of its jurisdiction with other agencies.' °"
IV. PROBLEMS WITH PARTIES AND REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 337
Section 337 as originally conceived provided in rem relief to
"I The Robinson Letter, supra note 46, at 2, argued that the ITC must defer countervailing
duty and dumping issues to the Treasury:
It is our view that practices which fall within the purview of the antidumping or
countervailing duty laws can also be elements of broader practices with respect to
which the Commission is empowered to grant relief under section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. At the same time we strongly believe, based on both policy and legal
grounds, that the Commission must refer these specific elements to the Department
of the Treasury for purposes of investigation. The Commission can then determine
whether relief is appropraite under section 337, based on new investigations or
rulings by Treasury and any investigation by the Commission of other alleged
practices.
The legal case that the ITC must defer to the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission on matters also within their jurisdiction is decidedly less persuasive than the
case for deferral to the Treasury in antidumping and countervailing duty matters. Section
337(a) explicitly provides the ITC with jurisdiction over unfair import practices, the effect
or tendency of which is "to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States."
The general policy arguments, however, such as avoiding duplicative proceedings, conflicting
resolutions, or contradictory remedies still apply.
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United States industries against unfair trade practices in interna-
tional trade which were either difficult or impossible to remedy
under other unfair competition statutes."0 The in rem approach to
unfair trade practices both set the ITC apart from other agencies
enforcing unfair trade practice and antitrust statutes and circum-
scribed the types of behavior over which the ITC could effect appro-
priate relief. Section 337 was not intended to be principally a mech-
anism whereby United States patent holders could protect them-
selves against foreign infringers, but the remedy of exclusion did not
lend itself to other forms of unfair competition arguably actionable
under subsection 337(a)."' While the addition of the cease and de-
sist power to the remedies available under section 337 has un-
doubtedly increased the scope of unfair practices against which the
ITC can reasonably respond, it is not without its own practical,
policy, and legal limitations.
The legal limitations on the cease and desist power arise princi-
pally from the language of subsection 337(a) which limits the ITC's
subject matter jurisdiction to unfair acts "in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, im-
porter, consignee, or agent of either.""' As long as the statute was
used to exclude articles, either themselves infringing United States
patents or which were manufactured under processes protected by
United States process patents, importation of the goods themselves
arguably constituted the unfair act and the conduct abroad, manu-
facture of an article infringing a process patented in the United
States, was a legitimate area of inquiry to establish relevant facts
about the merchandise." 3 Cease and desist power, however, is
grounded not upon goods but upon the person. Consequently, the
legitimate areas of inquiry are limited to acts by persons involved
in the importation of goods into the United States or in their sub-
sequent sale by the "owner, importer, consignee, or agent."", This
does not apparently include the manufacturer or exporter unless it
is involved in "importation," defined by case law as the act of bring-
I" See In re Frischer & Co., Inc., 17 C.C.P.A. 494, 512 (1929). (This case dealt with section
337's predecessor, section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858).
1 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
112 Id.
"' See In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
It is interesting to note that in Stainless Steel Pipe the Presiding Officer eliminated a
United States distributor on this basis but failed to see its relevance with respect to motions
by manufacturers and exporters. Compare Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26, Prehearing
Order Nos. 6 and 17 with the Order Dismissing Certain Respondents Adopting the Presiding
Officer's Opinion.
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ing articles into the United States."' Under this reading of the stat-
ute, no cease and desist order could be issued directly against for-
eign exporters and manufacturers; a cease and desist order designed
to prevent unfair acts by manufacturers and exporters abroad, such
as the alleged predatory pricing in Stainless Steel Pipe, would have
to be issued against importers, enjoining them from purchasing the
merchandise at unreasonably low prices. '
The ITC has declined to reach this anomalous result by avoiding
a clear statement as to the basis of its actions against foreign par-
ties. It is apparent from both Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel Pipe
that the ITC perceives its jurisdiction as reaching foreign manufac-
turers and exporters. In the latter case the Presiding Officer stated:
It is the purpose of section 337 to protect the United States market
from the effects of unfair methods of competition perpetrated by
foreign companies. If such unfair acts occur abroad and the foreign
articles are then exported to the United States so that the domestic
industry is injured, then it is within the authority of this Commis-
sion to examine such acts in order to consider whether relief should
be granted."'
As discussed earlier in this section, this reasoning has been accepted
by the courts where the remedy to be applied is based upon in rem
"I "Importation" has been defined by numerous cases as the act of bringing articles into
the United States. See United States v. Boshell, 14 C.C.P.A. 273 (1927), Cunard Steamship
Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) and United States v. John V. Carr and Son, 226 F. Supp.
175 (Cust. Ct. 1967). The importer has been defined as the first purchaser who resides in the
United States and who arranges for the goods to be brought into the United States. See
Handley Motors, Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 361 (Ct. Cl. 1964) and Import Wholesalers
Corp. v. United States, 368 F.2d 577 (Ct. Cl. 1966). The ITC has not apparently construed
these words in conformity with these opinions.
"' The ITC has not issued a cease and desist order to date. The consent order in Color TV
Sets, however, did prohibit parties from selling for export to the United States "at any price
in a predatory manner." This order applied to both manufacturers and exporters. Consent
Order, Color TV Sets, supra note 25.
"I Prehearing Order No. 17, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26. It is interesting to contrast
this language with that of the Order, In re Monolithic Catalytic Converters, Investigation No.
337-TA-18 (I.T.C., issued Dec. 3, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Monolithic Catalytic Convert-
ers], in which the ITC adopted the following reasoning of counsel for United States' distribu-
tors:
The statute conferring jurisdiction-refers to "importation" of articles. Mid-
America is not importing; rather, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (hereinafter
"VWoA") is the importer. The statute also refers to "or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee or agent of either." It is believed by Mid-America that a mere
sale alone is not contemplated by the statute, but the sale must be one which is
connected with the importation. Under this interpretation, Mid-America is not
covered by the statutory jurisdictional basis for the investigation and should be
removed as a party.
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jurisdiction over foreign goods imported from abroad, but would
seem to be inapplicable to cease and desist orders premised upon
personal jurisdiction over importers, owners, consignees, or agents.
Furthermore, the ITC has dismissed or excluded persons purchasing
from importers as parties to an investigation on the ground that
they did not fall within the statutory language;"18 this same logic can
be applied as a basis for precluding persons equally remote from the
act of importation, namely manufacturers and exporters. While the
ITC has to date not interpreted the statute this way, continued use
of the cease and desist power rests on its ability to include parties
in an investigation properly, and this should require a clear state-
ment by the ITC of the legal authority upon which jurisdiction is
premised.
In addition, the ITC's broad interpretation of the language of
subsection 337(a) would imply that it is no more restrictive than the
language of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Since the Congress
provided a clear distinction between subsection 337(a) and section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-the former applies to un-
fair acts "in the importation of articles into the United States""'
and the latter applies to unfair acts "in commerce"' 20-the argu-
ment that ITC jurisdiction is broader than the plain language of the
provision is open to question.
The weaknesses of section 337 as a remedial statute for unfair acts
occurring abroad are amplified by the interrelationship of the exclu-
sions and cease and desist orders. The enforcement mechanism pro-
vided for cease and desist orders under subsection 337(f) is limited
to alternative actions taken under subsections (d) and (e), that is,
exclusion.' Exclusion, however, is a particularly inappropriate
remedy because it is itself anticompetitive; by excluding goods from
competition, upward pressure is exerted on prices and consumer
choice is limited.'2 Moreover, the reach of an exclusion order is
"' Order, Monolithic Catalytic Converters, supra note 117.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
12 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
121 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. V 1975).
122 In commenting on Color TV Sets, the FTC concluded that exclusion is appropriate as a
remedy only in a limited context and not in antitrust cases:
We believe that the ITC would agree that an exclusion order is an extreme
remedy since it has the effect of completely eliminating an element of competition
in a domestic market and ignores the obvious fact that unfair pricing practices
occuring in international trade, even those which may have severe consequences,
can be restrained through incremental price remedies, without reducing the num-
ber of competitors or denying consumers the benefits of fair competition. Although
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limited to articles "imported by any person violating this sec-
tion."' 23 Even if the ITC finds that the language of subsection
337(a), "importation," does not limit the parties subject to investi-
gation and remedial order under its cease and desist power, the fact
that its ultimate enforcement mechanism, exclusion, is statutorily
limited to articles imported by persons violating the statute raises
serious doubts as to the ITC's authority to enforce a cease and desist
order through exclusion against non-importing foreign parties.
The practical limitations on the ITC's remedial powers are simi-
lar to those accompanying any extraterritorial application of United
States law. Assuming the ITC has authority under the statute to
investigate alleged violations and the parties named as violators,
personal jurisdiction must still be established. To date this issue
does not appear to have been directly addressed by the ITC, but the
issue has been raised by parties refusing to submit to discovery on
the ground that the ITC lacked personal jurisdiction.' The ITC has
not, however, forced resolution of the jurisdictional issue by resort-
ing to court enforcement; rather it has been content to apply eviden-
tiary sanctions and make its determination on an incomplete re-
cord. "'25 Given the complexity of this issue and the adverse effect
non-cooperation by foreign parties has on the outcome of an investi-
gaton, can the ITC be considered a proper forum for its resolution?
Practical and policy reasons suggest that the ITC's authority over
practices falling within other antitrust or unfair trade practice stat-
utes should be limited, particularly when one considers the relative
merits of remedial action by the Commission and other agencies.
The Department of Justice has characterized the choices of remedy
available in the ITC as being either "draconian" or "untested:"' 26
exclusion of articles from a market place may be necessary where the imports
infringe a domestic patent or where the imports consist of contaminated goods or
are otherwise a danger to the public health, exclusion as a remdy in section 337
antitrust cases is inconsistent with the antitrust principles to which this country
has long been committed. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Company v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
Tobin Letter, supra note 48, at 4-5.
" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Supp. V 1975).
12, See Statement of Certain Respondents, Stainless Steel Pipe, note 26 supra. (issued Aug.
4, 1977).
"2 See Prehearing Order No. 15, Stainless Steel Pipe note 26 supra (issued July 22, 1977).
Under the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, the Presiding Officer may "certify to the Commission a request that court enforcement
of the subpoena or other discovery order be sought." Rather than seeking court enforcement,
it has been the practice of the ITC to seek evidentiary sanctions.
" See Rose Letter, note 49 supra, at 12.
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"draconian" because the exclusion power is extreme and counter-
productive in dealing with unfair competition; "untested" because
the cease and desist power, and the ITC's ability to monitor and
enforce its orders under it, has not been challenged. Relative to
other agencies-the FTC and Departments of Justice and Treas-
ury-the forms of relief available to the ITC over antitrust and non-
patent unfair trade violations appear to be neither more effective or
appropriate, nor more capable of reaching conduct that would not
fall within the jurisdiction of at least one of the other agencies.
With respect to the Treasury Department's jurisdiction over for-
eign export subsidies and dumping, the remedy provided effectively
eliminates the advantage which foreign competitors gain through
subsidies or dumping by imposing an additional duty equal to the
margin of dumping or subsidization." 7 The Treasury investigation
is internationally recognized and therefore, does not raise problems
of extraterritorial jurisdiction or compulsory discovery. Further, the
Treasury has long established expertise in undertaking such investi-
gations and has the capability of effectively enforcing its decisions;
its Customs Service is both an experienced monitoring and enforce-
ment agency, and the remedy is not dependent upon any sanction
such as exclusion for enforcement. In contrast, the resolution of an
ITC investigation in the imposition of a cease and desist order re-
quires the establishment of personal jurisdiction, is not internation-
ally recognized, does not have the support of an experienced and
effective enforcement agency capable of day-to-day monitoring, and
ultimately is dependent on an anti-competitive remedy, exclusion.
The arguments favoring FTC and Department of Justice jurisdic-
tion over ITC jurisdiction are less compelling but still strong. The
scope of the combined subject matter jurisdiction of these two agen-
cies is at least equal to that of the ITC. 28 The FTC can grant relief
in the form of cease and desist orders and the Department of Justice
can seek equally effective relief through injunctions or fines. Both
agencies can enforce the relief granted through the courts and do not
require such a drastic remedy as exclusion. Finally, both agencies
are established antitrust enforcement agencies with staffs and pro-
cedures capable of monitoring and seeking enforcement of their
remedies. The ITC can at best claim only equal status on these
points, and this in itself puts into question the wisdom of duplicat-
ing the efforts of these other agencies.
"I See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V 1975) and 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
I21 See Rose Letter, note 49 supra, at 9-10.
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Finally, the entry of the ITC into the antitrust field raises not only
the specter of parties being subjected to costly and duplicative pro-
ceedings, but also the possibility that the relief provided by the ITC
will conflict with that provided by other agencies. Although there
have been no instances of directly contradictory relief to date,,2 9 it
is possible to conceive of them. For example, the Treasury Depart-
ment could impose a countervailing duty against a foreign govern-
ment subsidy while the ITC simultaneously issues an order compel-
ling foreign manufacturers to cease and desist from setting prices at
a level reflecting the amount of the subsidy. In such a case, the party
subjected to the order and duty would, in effect, have to account for
the subsidy twice in its prices. Similar instances of contradictory
remedies could equally appear with respect to other statutes and
agencies, creating an outcome which neither serves the public inter-
est nor preserves essential elements of fairness in our legal process.
V. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE INVESTIGATION
While much of the criticism of investigations under section 337
has focused on jurisdictional issues, equal attention should be given
to the procedures by which investigations are initiated and con-
ducted and their fairness. Any time an administrative agency is
given or assumes the authority to conduct full scale adjudicative
hearings into matters as complex as unfair competition, within rigid
time limits and without well defined pre-existing standards and
procedural rules, a danger exists that neither the public interest nor
fairness to the parties will be observed.
While the creation of adjudicative powers in administrative agen-
cies is undoubtedly founded in part upon the need to dispose of
certain legal issues more quickly than would be possible in court
litigation, the imposition by the Congress of stringent time limits
in a section 337 investigation has given rise to numerous problems
in the conduct of an investigation. Largely in response to Congress'
perception that ITC investigations under section 337 should be com-
pleted in a timely manner,'30 the Congress provided that investiga-
2I There is in fact precedent for terminating an investigation based upon the settlement
of proceedings in another agency. See Presiding Officer's Recommendation to Terminate and
to Determine No Violation, Angolan Coffee, note 24 supra. To date, however, section 337 has
been resorted to either concurrently with other proceedings, after unsatisfactory results from
other proceedings, or as an alternative to other proceedings. Presumably the President could
override contradictory forms of relief such as may arise from simultaneous investigation by
the ITC and Treasury in Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26.
's See FINANCE COMM. REP., note 19 supra, at 194.
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tions should be completed within twelve months of publication of
the notice of investigation unless the investigation was a more com-
plicated one, in which case eighteen months would be allowed.' 3' In
the event an investigation is designated as being more complicated,
the ITC must publish its reasons for the designation; the ITC ap-
pears to have interpreted this requirement as indicating a strong
congressional intent that investigations be concluded within the
twelve month rather than the eighteen month period.'3 2 An addi-
tional time constraint, expressed by the Senate Finance Committee,
is that "an investigation be commenced by the Commission as soon
as possible after receipt of a properly filed petition.' ' 33 Both of these
time limits raise the question of whether a determination on the
merits based on a complete record is possible under section 337.
Within the twelve (or eighteen) months allotted for an ITC inves-
tigation, the full procedures of an adjudicative proceeding are fol-
lowed. This includes an answer by the respondents, motions on a
full range of issues, discovery, prehearing conferences, hearings, the
recommended determination by the presiding officer, and ITC con-
sideration of that determination. T 4 In addition, when a temporary
exclusion order is requested,' 35 a preliminary hearing is held to de-
termine whether there is reason to believe that a violation of section
337 exists. The full hearing must be completed within seven months
of the publication of the notice of investigation'36 and the peliminary
hearing within three months of the publication.' 37
The language of section 337 provides that "[t]he Commission
shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint
under oath or upon its initiative."' 3 This language, as amplified by
131 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
"I This conclusion is drawn because in both Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel Pipe, the
criteria of the Senate Finance Committee and ITC Rules-namely, that the investigation be
of an involved nature, that information be difficult to obtain, or that a large number of parties
are involved-were satisfied at initiation and the ITC did not designate the investigation as
more complicated. In Color TV Sets it was later designated. See Recommended Ruling that
Motion to Designate This Investigation As "More Complicated" Be Granted. Color TV Sets,
supra note 25.
'" See FINANCE COMM. REP., note 19 supra, at 194. The ITC Rules require the initiation of
an investigation within 30 days of the proper filing of the complaint, 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (1977).
"I+ See 19 C.F.R. § 210 (1977).
l' 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (Supp. V 1975) authorizes the ITC to exclude articles from entry
during an investigation except under bond if they have "reason to believe" that section 337
has been violated. 19 C.F.R. § 210.41(a)(2) (1977) provides for a hearing pursuant to section
(e) above.
'3' 19 C.F.R. § 210.41(e)(1) (1977).
19 C.F.R. § 210.41(e)(2) (1977).
,: 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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the legislative history,"'3 would seem to require that, after receiving
a properly filed complaint'40 and allowing a brief period to identify
sources, determine the availability of information and look into pre-
liminary matters, the ITC initiate an investigation. The ITC has in
fact initiated investigations in a timely manner since the enactment
of the Trade Act of 1974.
Various questions arise from the statutory language and ITC
practice thereunder:
(1) Must the ITC initiate an investigation pursuant to any pro-
perly filed complaint?
(2) What discretion does the ITC have to reject a complaint
because of insufficient or unsubstantiated allegations?
(3) Does the statute permit preliminary hearings or investiga-
tions prior to initiation of a full investigation?
The answers to these questions are crucial to an evaluation of
whether the statutory time limits can be met without prejudice to
the rights of interested parties and whether section 337 enables
domestic interests to protect themselves from unfair foreign compe-
tition or provides a potent harassing device for protectionists. These
issues in turn focus on whether (1) the parameters of the investiga-
tion are sufficiently defined prior to initiation to permit the respon-
dents to defend within the limited time allowed and (2) the allega-
tions of a violation of section 337 are credible enough to merit the
mobilization of the resources of the United States Government and
the respondents in an investigation.
In the investigations of both Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel
Pipe respondents submitted motions to dismiss on the grounds that
the allegations of the complaint were insufficient. Commenting on
the latter case, the Department of Justice urged the ITC not to act
' The Finance Committee's report states:
Under amended section 337(b)(1), it is the intent of the Committee that an
investigation be commenced by the Commission as soon as possible after receipt of
a properly filed petition, but it is not the intent of the Committee to compel the
Commission to institute an investigation before it has had an adequate opportunity
to identify sources of relevant information, assure itself of the availability thereof,
and, if deemed necessary, prepare subpoenas therefore, and to give attention to
other preliminary matters.
FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 194.
"' There is some question as to what constitutes a properly filed complaint. Since the
statute provides no standards (e.g., reason to believe or suspect that a violation of section
337 has occurred) for the initiation of an investigation one must assume at a minimum that
"properly" means in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The subject of what
constitutes a sufficient complaint has been raised by the Justice Department, among others.
See text infra at notes 141-49.
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on the complaint and rely on the discovery process to subsequently
"establish the existence or non-existence of facts to support such a
broad notice pleading as the instant complaint . . . where no sub-
stantive evidence of the violation, other than low price levels, is
offered or even promised at the outset of the matter."'' The ITC
pursued both investigations despite opposition on this point from
the Department of Justice and the FTC.
Investigations under section 337 are governed by the APA112 which
requires that parties to an adjudicatory administrative hearing be
timely informed of "the matters of fact and law asserted.' ' 3 While
the pleading requirements of the APA allow broad notice pleading,
they do require sufficient particularity to allow the responding par-
ties to prepare a defense.'44 Further, the rules of the ITC require that
a complaint state specific allegations supported by a statement of
fact.'4 5 Former Chairman of the Commission, Will E. Leonard,
stated, with respect to the ITC rules, that: "The Commission is
going to be demanding a lot from parties. For example, the rules set
out rather extensive requirements for the format of complaints
under section 337, requiring rather specific allegations and support-
ing factual material as opposed to notice-type pleading."'48 The
notice-type pleading contemplated by the APA would present a
major obstacle to completing a full hearing within the time limits
of the statute. A bare notice pleading would, in addition to the
normal requirements of adjudication, leave the central issues and
allegations for definition after the investigation is initiated. While
the ITC rules if adhered to within the meaning apparently given to
them by Chairman Leonard might mitigate this problem, it has not
been the practice of the ITC to be demanding in reviewing a com-
plaint.'47 In Stainless Steel Pipe the issue whether a contract, com-
bination or conspiracy was subject to the investigation was not re-
solved until after the close of discovery and little more than one
'" Letter from Jonathon C. Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Daniel Minchew,
Chairman, ITC (Jan. 25, 1977), at 4.
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seq. (1970).
4 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
See Davis, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 524 (1958) and Administrative Procedure
Act, Legislative History, SENATE Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946).
" See 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1977).
us Remarks of Will E. Leonard, Chairman, United States International Trade Commission,
Before the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, May 10, 1976, at 11.
"I See, e.g., text supra at note 141.
[Vol. 8:81
REPEAL § 337
month prior to the scheduled hearings. 4 8 Furthermore, none of the
allegations in the complaint related a specific violation of section
337 to a particular respondent. 4 " Given the severe time constraints
of an investigation, the procedure of initiating investigations on
little more than a notice pleading would seem to present serious
risks that a determination would be made upon an inadequate re-
cord.
In addition to the lack of specificity in the allegations, when a
complaint is not specific uncertainties can also arise as to the par-
ties to be included. In Stainless Steel Pipe, the complaint initially
included few manufacturers who were subsequently found to pro-
duce the product under investigation.150 Additional manufacturers
were included after they appeared at the pre-initiation hearing.",
Subsequent to initiation, complainants and the ITC investigative
staff moved to include additional manufacturers. These motions
were rejected by the presiding officer on the grounds that inclusion
of additional parties after initiation requires a greater showing of a
section 337 violation than is required initially to include parties, and
because of the difficulty of including additional parties while
complying with the time requirements of the investigation.5 2 In
fact, the basis of the motion to include additional parties was that
the Treasury Department had included the parties in their parallel
investigation under the Antidumping Act of 1921. 53 The grounds
provided by the ITC staff and complainants were, in fact, signifi-
cantly more persuasive than those contained in the original com-
plaint. Nevertheless, because of lack of specificity in the complaint,
I The close of discovery in Stainless Steel Pipe was orally set for June 27, 1977. The issue
of whether a conspiracy was subject to investigation was not ruled upon until July 20, 1977,
at which time it was denied, Prehearing Order No. 14, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26
(issued July 20, 1977).
" The request for a more definite statement with respect to violations by individual res-
pondents was denied, although the complaint itself contained no specifics, Prehearing Order
No. 6, Stainless Pipe and Tube, supra note 26.
I" Nine of the original parties named in the complaint were subsequently dismissed be-
cause they did not manufacture for export to the United States or export to the United States.
Order Dismissing Certain Respondents, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26.
"I Six manufacturers, not in the original complaint, were included as respondents in the
"Notice of Investigation" after appearing at the preinitiation hearing. See Brief in Opposition
to Institution of an Investigation, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26. If they had not appeared
at that time, none of the principal Japanese manufacturers would have been parties at the
initiation.
131 Prehearing Order No. 13, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26. (I.T.C. issued June 27,
1977).
"I Complainants' Motion Requesting That Certain Additional Japanese Manufacturers Be
Named As Respondents in This Investigation, Stainless Steel Pipe, supra note 26.
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the ITC included numerous respondents in the investigation with no
substantial facts alleged to tie them to a violation of section 337 and,
because of time limitations was forced to exclude others who, in the
opinion of the staff and complainants, were appropriate parties and
for which at least some factual basis existed for inclusion.154
Both Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel Pipe illustrate the diffi-
culties confronting the ITC in terms of determining parties, issues
of fact, and legal issues to be included in an investigation. While it
can and has been argued that the language of section 337 is obliga-
tory and thereby requires the initiation of an investigation pursuant
to a properly filed complaint, 5' the ITC can require that certain
minimum standards be met. In the first instance, the ITC has exer-
cised this authority in promulgating regulations which set certain
minimum requirements for a complaint.'" In implementing these
regulations, the ITC could seek to avoid difficulties in meeting the
statutory time limits and unfairness to the respondents by returning
complaints for additional information should they not specify the
parties and behavior complained of and support such allegations
with adequate statements of fact. This practice is not uncommon
in the Treasury Department where, as in the ITC, no provision is
made for preliminary investigations and strict time limits are ap-
plied under the Antidumping Act of 1921.11 In light of the complex-
ity of recent investigations under section 337, a practice of demand-
ing more of complainants prior to initiating an investigation should
be implemented.
It is often difficult for domestic parties who perceive injury by
unfair foreign competition to develop sufficient information about
the practices of foreign companies to meet a higher standard of
specificity in their complaints. This is particularly true where the
United States industry is small or where the origin of the unfair act
or acts is outside the United States. In such a case, rather than
initiating an investigation on insufficient grounds, the ITC might
resort to its power under section 603 of the Trade Act of 1974 which
authorizes it to "conduct preliminary investigations, determine the
"' The factual basis amounted to no more than establishing that the companies which the
complainants wished to include manufactured the product under investigation.
"I See Kaye and Plaia, note 74 supra, at 29.
156 See 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1977).
,51 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) allows the Secretary thirty days after
receipt of an antidumping petition to determine whether to initiate an investigation. As a
matter of practice the Treasury has on occasion requested parties to improve certain aspects
of their petitions and has returned them as being insufficient.
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scope and manner of its proceedings, and consolidate proceedings
before it."'' ' Although the ITC has never initiated a preliminary
investigation under section 603 on the basis of a complaint filed
under section 337, it did on its own initiative investigate unfair
practices in the importation of black-and-white televisions and tele-
vision parts under section 603 in conjunction with the section 337
investigation of color televisions and later consolidated it in the
section 337 investigation."9 More important than this precedent
under section 603, however, is the fact that the use of section 603
would, while not mandated by section 337 or 603, appear to be
permitted by the statute. Unlike an investigation under section 201,
the ITC is not required under section 337 to "promptly" make an
investigation.'60 While the legislative history indicates that it is con-
templated that the ITC will not delay in the initiation of an investi-
gation,'"' it does not prescribe or discuss the time limits between the
filing of a complaint and the initiation of an investigation. Further,
section 603 is not limited in its applicability to the Commission's
authority to act under other sections of the statute and, therefore,
would seem to be a provision of general authority to be used where
other sections of the statute might be inapplicable or inadequate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 337 has provided a remedy against unfair import prac-
tices for more than 50 years. For most of that period it has been
unused or used only against alleged patent infringements. The
changes effected by the Trade Act of 1974 and the new activism by
the ITC itself have brought section 337 to the fore as a potent new
weapon for aggrieved domestic industries. Section 337, however,
does not fill any substantial need for protection and redress of griev-
ances unmet by other statutes, and it has substantial liability. It
is at best ambiguous and, therefore, unpredictable on the important
issues of jurisdiction over both subject matter and over parties; it
is duplicative of relief available through other agencies and less
effective in enforcing that relief; and its procedural limitations serve
neither the public interest nor the demand for fairness in adjudica-
tion. No one's interest would suffer from the repeal of section 337.
19 U.S.C. § 2482(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Investigation No. 603-TA-1.
"' 19 U.S.C. § 2251, commonly referred to as § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, requires the
ITC to "promptly make an investigation." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
-' FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 19, at 194.
19781
114 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
If it is not repealed one can only hope that a combination of respon-
sible administration by the ITC and eventual changes in the statute
itself will prevent it from becoming a significant impediment to our
international trade.
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the ITC issued a cease and desist order
against eleven of the Japanese respondents in the Stainless Steel Pipe investigation. The
cease and desist order prohibits the respondent manufacturers from selling for export into the
United States any of the articles subject to the investigation below the reasonably anticipated
marginal cost of production, if such sales are without commercial justification. The ITC
indicated that prices above average variable cost would be considered above reasonably
anticipated marginal cost. A similar proscription was applied to exporters and importers who
were respondents in the case. The ITC will apparently impute knowledge of suppliers' costs
to the exporters and importers. Extensive reporting is required of all of the respondents
subject to the order. The order was issued February 22, 1978, and will take effect, unless the
President overrides it, within sixty days. A violation of the order would allow the ITC to
exclude the articles subject to the order from entry into the United States under section
33 7(f).
The ITC took strong exception to the argument that section 337 proceedings should be
discontinued when the activity under investigation is also the subject of a concurrent investi-
gation under the Antidumping Act. The commissioners stressed that section 337 is a remedy
in addition to remedies provided by other provisions of law and that, in any event, broader
questions of fact were raised under section 337. The ITC also adopted a broad interpretation
of both its subject matter and personal jurisdiction under section 337. They concluded that
the phrase "in the importation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee or agent of either" included owners abroad of articles manufactured for
exportation. In addition, they found that they had personal jurisdiction over all the parties
to the investigation and, in the majority opinion subscribed to by three of the commissioners,
stated that the cease and desist power under section 337(f) is "ancillary and subordinate" to
their exclusionary power under section 337(d). Since they maintained that the exclusionary
power is based upon in rem jurisdiction only, these commissions concluded that the ancil-
lary and subordinate power to issue cease and desist orders could be based on in rem juris-
diction. The ITC thereby seems to have created a precedent whereby cease and desist order
can be based on in rem jurisdiction.
The ITC, in overruling the Presiding Officer's finding that there was no violation of section
337 because there was no injury, found that there was a tendency to restrain trade and
commerce in the United States. The ITC apparently based this tendency on the effect of
Japanese imports on other imports and not on the United States industry. The relevant
section of the opinion states:
Simply stated, what we have found here is that the sale by certain respondents of
stainless steel pipe and tube in the US. market at prices below A VC is an unfair
act which has a tendency to restrain trade and commerce in the United States by
substantially reducing the domestic market share of other foreign competitors.
This is the broadest of all possible interpretations of the Act.
In conclusion, the ITC would seem to have taken a broad interpretation of section 337 in
deciding the Stainless Steel Pipe case. The restraint which the ambiguities of this statute
require was not evidenced by the opinion. Indeed, should the President not override the ITC's
decision in this case, it can be said that the statute is a potent new weapon for use by United
States industry, in addition to and concurrent with other statutes, to prevent import competi-
tion.
